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Abstract
Suppose a database containing M records is replicated across N servers, and a user wants to privately retrieve one record by
accessing the servers such that identity of the retrieved record is secret against any up to T servers. A scheme designed for this
purpose is called a private information retrieval (PIR) scheme. In practice, capacity-achieving and small sub-packetization are both
desired for PIR schemes, because the former implies the highest download rate and the latter usually means simple realization.
For general values of N, T,M , the only known capacity-achieving PIR scheme was designed by Sun and Jafar in 2016 with
sub-packetization NM . In this paper, we design a linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme with much smaller sub-packetization
dnM−1, where d = gcd(N,T ) and n = N/d. Furthermore, we prove that for any linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme it must
have sub-packetization no less than dnM−1, implying our scheme has the optimal sub-packetization. Moreover, comparing with
Sun and Jafar’s scheme, our scheme reduces the field size by a factor of 1
NdM−2
.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the pioneer work by Chor et al. [7] in 1995, the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) can be formulated
as N distributed servers each storing the replication of a database containing M independent records W1, ...,WM and a user
who wants to retrieve one record by accessing the servers while keeping identity of the retrieved record private from any
individual server. Besides extensive applications in cryptographic protocols [4], [10], PIR is also closely related to coding
theory and theoretical computer science, e.g., locally decodable code [19] and one-way function [5].
A central issue for the PIR problem is reducing communication cost. In the initial setting of PIR where each record is one
bit long, communication cost is measured by the total number of bits transferred from the user to the servers (i.e. upload size)
and bits from the servers to the user (i.e. download size). By now, the most efficient PIR schemes require communication cost
MO(
1
log logM ) [8], [9]. Determining the limits on communication cost for PIR remains an open problem. However, it is more
common in application scenarios that the size of each record is much larger than M and N , thus the upload size is negligible
compared to the download size. As a result, communication cost can be measured by taking only the download size into
account. Specifically, define the rate of a PIR scheme as the ratio between the retrieved data size and the download size, and
define capacity as the supremum of the rate over all PIR schemes. In other words, capacity characterizes the maximum number
of bits that can be privately retrieved per bit of downloaded data. Recently, much work has been done on determining the
capacity of PIR in various cases. Sun and Jafar first proved in [12] the capacity of PIR for replicated servers is 1−1/N
1−(1/N)M
. Then
they extended to considering PIR with privacy amplification secure against any colluding set containing at most T servers,
1 ≤ T < N . They proved in [13] the capacity for this extension is 1−T/N
1−(T/N)M
. Meanwhile, the capacity for PIR with symmetric
privacy [14] and for PIR with MDS coded servers [1], [16] have been determined in some cases. For other variants of PIR,
such as multi-message retrieval [2] and PIR from Byzantine servers [3], the problem of reducing download cost has also been
considered.
Achievability of the capacity is usually proved by constructing general capacity-achieving PIR schemes. These schemes are
mostly implemented by dividing each record into segments and querying from each server some combinations of transformed
segments. We call the number of segments contained in each record that are necessary for the scheme implementation as
sub-packetization of the scheme. For linear schemes where only linear operations are involved, small sub-packetization usually
implies simple scheme implementation. The problem of reducing sub-packetization has been deeply studied in the literature
of minimum storage regenerating codes [11], [17]. While for the PIR problem, study on sub-packetization of PIR schemes is
scarce. On the one hand, some PIR schemes with small sub-packetization (e.g. linear sub-packetization) [6], [18] are built at
the sacrifice of non-achieving of capacity. On the other hand, most known capacity-achieving schemes with asymmetric privacy
have exponential sub-packetization. For example, the capacity-achieving schemes in [12] and [13] have sub-packetization NM .
The lower bound on sub-packetization for PIR schemes is unknown in many cases.
A. Related work
In [15] the authors characterized the optimal download cost for arbitrary record length and designed a PIR scheme attaining
the capacity proved in [12] with file size NM−1. Moreover, they proved this is the smallest possible file size for achieving
capacity in this case. The file size they discussed there actually means sub-packetization in our language. Thus this can be
2regarded as the first lower bound on sub-packetization for capacity-achieving PIR schemes with replicated servers and T = 1
privacy.
B. Our contribution
In this work, we focus on sub-packetization for capacity-achieving PIR schemes with replicated servers and T privacy, where
1 ≤ T < N . We prove that sub-packetization for linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes is lower bounded by dnM−1, where d =
gcd(N, T ) and n = N/d. We further design a general linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes with sub-packetization dnM−1.
Comparing with the scheme in [13], we reduce the sub-packetization by a factor of 1
ndM−1
, which leads to a great simplification
in implementation. Based on the lower bound, our scheme actually attains the optimal sub-packetization. Moreover, a much
smaller field (i.e. reducing from [13] by a factor of 1
NdM−2
) is enough for our scheme.
For proving the lower bound on sub-packetization, we establish connections between the entropy of random variables and the
rank of corresponding linear objects. Based on these connections and some identities about information entropy for capacity-
achieving PIR schemes, we derive several useful structural properties for linear PIR schemes. Our approach for proving the
lower bound may be helpful for studying sub-packetization of PIR schemes in other cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formally introduce the PIR model studied in this work and
reprove the capacity of PIR schemes. In Section III we prove a lower bound on sub-packetization for linear capacity-achieving
PIR schemes. Then in Section IV we present a general linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme with optimal sub-packetization.
Finally Section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations and the PIR model
For a positive integer n ∈ N, we denote by [n] the subset {1, ..., n}. The vectors throughout this paper are always row
vectors. For any vector Q = (q1, ..., qn) and any subset Γ = {i1, ..., im} ⊆ [n], let QΓ = (qi1 , ..., qim). Moreover, in order
to distinguish indices for the servers from those for the records, we usually use superscripts as indices for the servers and
subscripts for the records. For example, in the below we use Q
(i)
θ denote the query to the ith server when the user wants the
θth record. Throughout the paper we use cursive capital letters to denote random variables, such as W ,Q, etc.
Suppose a database consisting of M recordsW1, ...,WM is replicated across N servers Serv
(1), ..., Serv(N), i.e., each server
stores all the M records. In general, we assume the records are independent and of the same size, i.e.
H(W1, ...,WM ) =
M∑
i=1
H(Wi) = ML, and
H(Wi) = L, ∀i ∈ [M ]
(1)
where H(·) denotes the entropy function. A PIR scheme enables a user to retrieve a record, say Wθ , for some θ ∈ [M ], from
the N servers while keeping θ secret from any colluding subsets containing at most T servers. More specifically, a PIR scheme
consists of two phases:
• Query phase. Given an index θ ∈ [M ] and some random resources S, the user computes Que(θ,S) = (Q
(1)
θ , ...,Q
(N)
θ ),
and sends Q
(i)
θ to Serv
(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Note that S and θ are private information only known by the user, and Que(·, ·)
is the query function determined by the scheme. Define
Q , {Q
(i)
θ |i ∈ [N ], θ ∈ [M ]} ∪ {S, θ} . (2)
It is natural to assume
I(W[M ];Q) = 0 (3)
which means the user generates his queries without knowing exact content of the records.
• Response phase. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the ith server Serv(i) at receiving Q
(i)
θ , computes Ans
(i)(Q
(i)
θ ,W[M ]) = A
(i)
θ and sends
it back to the user, where Ans(i)(·, ·) is Serv(i)’s answer function determined by the scheme. It is easy to see
H(A
(i)
θ |W[M ],Q
(i)
θ ) = 0 (4)
To design a PIR scheme is to design the functions Que and Ans(i) such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) Correctness:
H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Q
[N ]
θ ,S, θ) = 0, (5)
which means the user can definitely recover the record Wθ after he gets answers from all the servers. Based on the
definition of Q in (2), the correctness conditions is also represented as H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Q) = 0.
(2) Privacy: For any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| ≤ T ,
I(θ;QΓθ ,A
Γ
θ ,W[M ]) = 0, (6)
3which means any up to T servers get no information about the index θ. Note that QΓθ ,A
Γ
θ ,W[M ] are all the information
held by the servers in Γ.
Such a scheme is also called a T -private PIR scheme in [13] as it generalizes the PIR scheme in [12] which stands only for
the special case of T = 1. In this paper, for simplicity we omit the word T -private although all of our results work for general
values of T .
To measure download efficiency of a PIR scheme, we define its rate as
R ,
H(Wθ)∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ )
=
L
D
,
where D is the total size of data downloaded by the user from all servers, i.e. D =
∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ ). In other words, R
characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit. Furthermore, the supremum of the rate
over all PIR schemes working for a given PIR model is called the capacity of PIR, denoted by CPIR.
B. Capacity of PIR schemes
For the sake of later use, in this section we briefly reprove capacity for the PIR schemes through a series of key lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any θ, θ′ ∈ [M ], and for any subset Λ ⊆ [M ] and Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| ≤ T ,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
Γ
θ′ |WΛ,Q) .
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. For any subset Λ ⊆ [M ], for any θ ∈ Λ and θ′ ∈ [M ]− Λ,
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) ≥
TL
N
+
T
N
H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ∪{θ′},Q) .
Proof. Since for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T ,
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) ≥ H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q) , (7)
then
H(A
[N]
θ |WΛ,Q)
≥
1(
N
T
) ∑
Γ:Γ⊆[N],|Γ|=T
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q)
(a)
=
1(
N
T
) ∑
Γ:Γ⊆[N],|Γ|=T
H(AΓθ′ |WΛ,Q)
(b)
≥
T
N
H(A
[N]
θ′
|WΛ,Q) (8)
=
T
N
(H(A
[N]
θ′
,Wθ′ |WΛ,Q)−H(Wθ′ |A
[N]
θ′
,WΛ,Q))
(c)
=
T
N
(H(Wθ′ |WΛ,Q) +H(A
[N]
θ′
|WΛ∪{θ′},Q))
(d)
=
TL
N
+
T
N
H(A
[N]
θ′
|WΛ∪{θ′},Q)
where (a) comes from Lemma 1, the inequality (b) follows from the Han’s inequality, (c) is due to the factH(Wθ′ |A
[N ]
θ′ ,WΛ,Q) =
0 which is implied from the correctness condition (5), and (d) is a consequence of the assumption (1) and (3).
Theorem 3. ( [13]) For T -private PIR with M records and N replicated servers, the capacity
CPIR =
1
1 + T
N
+ T
2
N2
+ · · ·+ T
M−1
NM−1
.
Proof. A general PIR scheme given in [13] proves achievability of this capacity, so here we only reprove for any PIR scheme,
R ≤
1
1 + T
N
+ T
2
N2
+ · · ·+ T
M−1
NM−1
.
From the definition, it has
R =
H(Wθ)∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ )
≤
L
H(A
[N ]
θ )
≤
L
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q)
. (9)
4Therefore, it is sufficient to prove for any θ ∈ [M ],
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) ≥
M−1∑
i=0
T i
N i
L . (10)
First, we have
L = H(Wθ)
(a)
= H(Wθ|Q)−H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Q)
= I(Wθ;A
[N ]
θ |Q)
= H(A
[N ]
θ |Q)−H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q)
(11)
where (a) comes from (3) and (5). Then by Lemma 2, it follows H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q) ≥
TL
N
+ T
N
(H(A
[N ]
θ′ |W{θ,θ′},Q). By
recursively using Lemma 2, we finally have
H(A
[N]
θ |Wθ,Q) ≥
M−1∑
i=1
T i
N i
L+
TM−1
NM−1
H(A
[N]
θ′′ |W[M],Q)
(b)
=
M−1∑
i=1
T i
N i
L (12)
where (b) comes from the fact H(A
[N ]
θ′′ |W[M ],Q) = 0 which is a consequence of (4). Combining (11) and (12), we immediately
obtain (10).
III. LOWER BOUND ON SUB-PACKETIZATION
In this section, we prove a lower bound on sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes, i.e.,
Theorem 4. Suppose M ≥ 2, N > T ≥ 1. For all linear capacity-achieving T -private PIR schemes with M records and N
replicated servers, its sub-packetization L has a lower bound, i.e.,
L ≥ dnM−1
where d = gcd(N, T ), n = N
d
.
Toward proving this theorem, we first list some useful identities for general capacity-achieving PIR schemes in Section
III-A. Then in Section III-B we restrict to linear schemes and prove some useful properties. We finish the proof of Theorem
4 in Section III-C.
A. Some identities for capacity-achieving PIR schemes
Recall that throughout this paper we study the PIR schemes working for N replicated servers with M independent records,
and maintaining the T -privacy for 1 ≤ T < N . For simplicity, we call these schemes just as PIR schemes. Such a scheme is
called capacity-achieving if its rate equals the CPIR in Theorem 3.
Proposition 5. For a capacity-achieving PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], it holds
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) =
N∑
i=1
H(A
(i)
θ ) = D (13)
H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q) = D − L. (14)
Proof. From (9) in the proof of Theorem 3, it has
R =
H(Wθ)∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ )
=
L
D
≤
L
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q)
≤
1
1 + T
N
+ T
2
N2
+ · · ·+ T
M−1
NM−1
.
for any PIR scheme. Particularly, for any capacity-achieving PIR scheme, the equalities above hold simultaneously. Therefore,
we obtain H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) =
∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ ) = D.
The identity (14) follows from (11) and (13) immediately.
5Proposition 6. For any capacity-achieving PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], any Λ ⊆ [M ], and any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T , it
holds
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) =
{
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q), if θ ∈ Λ
T
N
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q), if θ /∈ Λ
Proof. For any capacity-achieving PIR scheme, the inequalities in the proof of Lemma 2 must hold with equalities simultane-
ously. Specifically, from (7) we can see for any θ ∈ Λ,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) , (15)
and from (8) we can see for any θ′ ∈ [M ]− Λ,
T
N
H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Q)
=
1(
N
T
) ∑
Γ′:Γ′⊆[N ],|Γ′|=T
H(AΓ
′
θ′ |WΛ,Q)
(a)
=
1(
N
T
) ∑
Γ′:Γ′⊆[N ],|Γ′|=T
H(AΓ
′
θ |WΛ,Q)
(b)
= H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q)
(c)
= H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q)
(d)
= H(AΓθ′ |WΛ,Q)
where (a) and (d) come from Lemma 1, while (b) and (c) follow from (15).
B. Properties of linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes
We first give formal definitions of linear PIR schemes and sub-packetization.
Definition 7. Suppose each record is expressed as an L-dimensional vector over Fq, i.e., Wi ∈ F
L
q for 1 ≤ i ≤ M . A PIR
scheme is called linear over Fq if for retrieving any record Wθ , θ ∈ [M ], the answers provided by Serv
(j), 1 ≤ j ≤ N , is
A
(j)
θ =
M∑
i=1
WiQ
(j)
θ,i ∈ F
γj
q ,
where Q
(j)
θ,i is an L× γj matrix over Fq, 1 ≤ i ≤M . Equivalently, for a linear PIR scheme, it has
(A
(1)
θ , A
(2)
θ , ..., A
(N)
θ )
= (W1,W2, ...,WM )


Q
(1)
θ,1 Q
(2)
θ,1 · · · Q
(N)
θ,1
Q
(1)
θ,2 Q
(2)
θ,2 · · · Q
(N)
θ,2
...
...
...
...
Q
(1)
θ,M Q
(2)
θ,M · · · Q
(N)
θ,M

 (16)
and the matrix (Q
(j)
θ,i)1≤i≤M
1≤j≤N
defines the queries for retrieving θ. Moreover, L is called sub-packetization of the linear PIR
scheme.
Remark 1. Note that a linear PIR scheme is implemented by linear operations over a finite field Fq. That is, a symbol in
Fq is an atomic unit in implementation of the scheme. Since L denotes the number of symbols contained in each record that
are necessary for the scheme implementation, we call L as sub-packetization of the scheme. It can be seen small values of L
imply less operations involved in realization, and thus a simpler scheme.
Remark 2. Recall in Section II-A and (1), L has been used to denote the entropy of each record, i.e. H(Wi) = L for
1 ≤ i ≤ M . For linear PIR schemes, we represent each record as an L-dimensional vector over Fq. Because it is natural to
assume that each coordinate of a record is independently and uniformly distributed in Fq , by choosing a proper logarithm in
the entropy function each record in the L-dimensional vector-representation also has entropy L. Moreover, for any random
variable in the vector-representation, its entropy actually equals the number of independent symbols in Fq contained in the
vector.
Note that in Section II-A we regard each variable as a random variable, while in this section these variables are represented
as vectors or matrices. A key point for proving Theorem 4 is to establish connections between entropy of random variables
6and ranks of the corresponding linear objects. In Remark 2 we explain the basic connection, and in the next lemma we give
another important connection.
Lemma 8. For a linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ] and any nonempty sets Γ ⊆ [N ],Λ ⊆ [M ], it has
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) = rank(Q
Γ
θ,[M ]−Λ). (17)
Proof. Firstly, from Definition 7, we have
AΓθ =
∑
i∈Λ
WiQ
Γ
θ,i +
∑
i∈[M ]−Λ
WiQ
Γ
θ,i . (18)
On the other hand, the left side of (17) is the entropy of AΓθ on the condition of WΛ and Q. Thus based on the correspondence
between random variables and linear objects, this lemma actually requires to compute the entropy of AΓθ for fixed WΛ and
Q , (Q
(j)
θ,i)1≤i≤M
1≤j≤N
.
Since WΛ and Q are fixed, from (18) we can see randomness of A
Γ
θ only depends on
∑
i∈[M ]−ΛWiQ
Γ
θ,i. That is, A
Γ
θ
and
∑
i∈[M ]−ΛWiQ
Γ
θ,i have the identical distribution. While the latter is linear combinations of independent symbols Wi,s,
i ∈ [M ]−Λ and 1 ≤ s ≤ L. Suppose rank(QΓ
θ,[M ]−Λ) = r, thenQ
Γ
θ,[M ]−Λ has r linearly independent columns, corresponding to
r coordinates of
∑
i∈[M ]−ΛWiQ
Γ
θ,i. It can be seen that these r coordinates completely determine the vector
∑
i∈[M ]−ΛWiQ
Γ
θ,i.
Moreover, each of the r coordinates is independently and uniformly distributed in Fq . Because the entropy is measured by the
number of independent symbols in Fq , the lemma follows.
Based on the connections stated in Remark 2 and Lemma 8, we can further derive some properties of the linear objects in
linear PIR schemes.
Proposition 9. For a linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], it holds
rank(Q
[N ]
θ,θ ) = L .
Proof. For simplicity, denote θ¯ , [M ]− θ. By Lemma 8 we have rank(Q
[N ]
θ,θ ) = H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q). Then
H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q)
(a)
= H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q)−H(A
[N ]
θ |W[M ],Q)
= I(A
[N ]
θ ;Wθ|Wθ¯,Q)
= H(Wθ|Wθ¯,Q)−H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Wθ¯,Q)
(b)
= H(Wθ|Wθ¯,Q)
(c)
= L
where (a) is due to (4), (b) comes from the correctness condition (5), and (c) is from the assumptions (1) and (3).
Proposition 10. For a linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ] and any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T , it holds
rank(QΓθ,θ) =
TL
N
, (19)
rank(QΓ
θ,θ¯
) = D − L. (20)
Proof. From Lemma 8, we have
rank(QΓθ,θ) = H(A
Γ
θ |Wθ¯,Q)
(a)
=
T
N
H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q)
(b)
=
T
N
rank(Q
[N ]
θ,θ )
(c)
=
TL
N
where (a) is from Proposition 6, (b) is due to Lemma 8 and (c) comes from Proposition 9. Similarly, by successively using
Lemma 8, Proposition 6 and (14) we have
rank(QΓ
θ,θ¯
) = H(AΓθ |Wθ,Q)
= H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q)
= D − L.
7C. Proof of Theorem 4
Some basic lemmas are stated below before proving Theorem 4. Proofs of these lemmas can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 11. Let a, b,m ∈ N. Suppose d1 = gcd(a, b), d2 = gcd(a
m,
∑m
i=0 a
m−ibi), then d2 = d
m
1 .
Lemma 12. Let V1, ..., VN be N linear subspaces of F
L and denote V =
∑N
i=1 Vi. Suppose T ∈ N and 1 ≤ T < N . If for
any subset Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T it holds dim(
∑
i∈Γ Vi) =
T
N
dimV , then N | dimV and dim(Vi) =
1
N
dimV for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Moreover ,
V = ⊕Ni=1Vi, (21)
Next we prove Theorem 4.
Proof. We finish the proof in three steps:
(1) Prove L and D have specific forms, i.e., L = µnM−1 and D = µ
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iti for some µ ∈ N.
For capacity-achieving schemes, we have
R =
L
D
=
1
1 + t
n
+ · · ·+ t
M−1
nM−1
=
nM−1∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iti
. (22)
Based on the connection stated in Remark 2 both L and D are integers, thus (22) implies nM−1|L
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iti. Note
that gcd(n, t) = 1, so by Lemma 11 it has gcd(nM−1,
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iti) = 1. As a result, we have nM−1|L. That is, there
exists an integer µ such that L = µnM−1. Combining with (22) it follows D = µ
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iti.
(2) Prove N | L.
For any i ∈ [N ], denote Vi = Cspan(Q
(i)
θ,θ) where Cspan(·) denotes the linear space spanned by all columns of the matrix.
Thus from Proposition 9 it has dim(
∑N
i=1 Vi) = rank(Q
[N ]
θ,θ ) = L, and from (19) it has dim(
∑
i∈Γ Vi) = rank(Q
Γ
θ,θ) =
T
N
L
for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T . Therefore, by Lemma 12 it follows N | L.
Moreover, it has V = ⊕Ni=1Vi which implies rank(Q
Γ
θ,θ) =
∑
i∈Γ rank(Q
i
θ,θ). By Lemma 8 we have
H(AΓθ |Wθ¯,Q) =
∑
i∈Γ
H(A
(i)
θ |Wθ¯,Q) . (23)
(3) Prove T | D − L
For any θ′ 6= θ, it can be seen that
rank(QΓθ,θ′)
(a)
= H(AΓθ |Wθ′ ,Q)
(b)
= H(AΓθ′ |Wθ′ ,Q)
(c)
=
∑
i∈Γ
H(A
(i)
θ′ |Wθ′ ,Q)
(d)
=
∑
i∈Γ
H(A
(i)
θ |Wθ′ ,Q)
(e)
=
∑
i∈Γ
rank(Q
(i)
θ,θ′) (24)
where (a) and (e) hold because of Lemma 8, (b) and (d) is due to Lemma 1, and (c) comes from (23).
Because (24) holds for all θ′ ∈ θ¯, it follows rank(QΓ
θ,θ¯
) =
∑
i∈Γ rank(Q
(i)
θ,θ¯
). From (20) we know rank(QΓ
θ,θ¯
) = D − L.
Therefore, for any set Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T , it holds
∑
i∈Γ rank(Q
(i)
θ,θ¯
) = D − L. It can be derived that rank(Q
(i)
θ,θ¯
) =
rank(Q
(j)
θ,θ¯
) for any i, j ∈ [N ] and T | D − L.
Finally, from N | L and L = µnM−1 we have d | µnM−2. Similarly, from T | D−L and D−L = µ
∑M−1
i=1 n
M−1−iti we
have d | µ
∑M−2
i=0 n
M−2−iti. Therefore,
d | gcd(µnM−2, µ
M−2∑
i=0
nM−2−iti) .
However, because gcd(n, t) = 1 we know from Lemma 11 that gcd(nM−2,
∑M−2
i=0 n
M−2−iti) = 1 . Hence we have d | µ and
thus µ ≥ d. As a result, L = µnM−1 ≥ dnM−1.
8IV. THE PIR SCHEME WITH L = dnM−1
In this section, for M ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ T < N , we present a linear capacity-achieving PIR scheme with sub-packetization
L = dnM−1.
A. Examples
We begin with a simple example.
Example 1. Suppose M = 2, N = 3 and T = 2. In this case the sub-packetization of our scheme is L = d(N
d
)M−1 = 3, so
we regard each record as a 3-dimensional vector over a finite field Fq, i.e., W1,W2 ∈ F
3
q .
1 WLOG, suppose the user wants
W1. The scheme is described in two parts:
Part 1: Mixing-Expanding.
Let S1, S2 ∈ F
3×3
q be two matrices chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 3× 3 invertible matrices over
Fq. Actually, S1 and S2 are the random resources privately held by the user. Let G[3,2] ∈ F
2×3
q be a generator matrix of a
[3, 2] MDS code over Fq. Then, define
(a1, a2, a3) = W1S1
(b1, b2, b3) = W2S2[:, (1 : 2)]G[3,2] (25)
where S2[:, (1 : 2)] denotes the 3 × 2 matrix formed by the first 2 columns of S2. Note that W1S1 induces an invertible
transformation of W1 and we call this a mixing process. Similarly, W2S2[:, (1 : 2)] generates a mixing vector from W2 with
only 2 coordinates drawn from 3 coordinates. Then by multiplyingG[3,2] it expands a 2-dimensional vector into a 3-dimensional
vector. The MDS property ensures that any 2 coordinates of (b1, b2, b3) suffice to recover the entire vector.
Part 2: Combining.
Since the ai’s contain information of the desired record W1, we call them desired symbols. Correspondingly, the bi’s are
called undesired symbols. For a combination ai + bj we call it a mixed symbol. At queries of the user, the answers given by
all the servers are composed of the three kinds of symbols. Specifically, the answers are formed by iteratively applying the
following two steps:
(a1) Enforcing record symmetry within the query to each server.
(a2) Combining undesired symbols with new desired symbols.
We explain these two steps through the example. As displayed in Fig.1, the user first asks for a1 and a2 respectively from
Serv(1) and Serv(2). These are both desired symbols. Then applying Step (a1), he simultaneously asks for b1 and b2 to enforce
symmetry with respect to both records within the query to each server. Note that b1 and b2 are undesired symbols. A high-rate
PIR scheme will try to use these undesired symbols decode more desired symbols. Thus applying Step (a2) the user also asks
for a3 + b3 from Serv
(3).
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1 a2
(a1)
(a2)
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1, b1 a2, b2
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1, b1 a2, b2
a3 + b3
Fig. 1. Query sequence in the (M = 2, N = 3, T = 2) PIR scheme.
Now we show the scheme satisfies the correctness condition and the privacy condition. Recall that (b1, b2, b3) is a codeword
in a [3, 2] MDS code. Thus the desired symbol a3 can be decoded from the mixed symbol a3 + b3 by using b1 and b2. The
correctness condition follows immediately.
As to the privacy condition, we need to show that for any up to T = 2 colluding servers, their query sequence for retrieving
W1, which is actually a random variable induced by the random matrices S1 and S2, has the same distribution as the query
sequence for retrievingW2. Actually, if the user wantsW2, the scheme goes the same way except for exchanging the generation
processes of ai’s and bi’s in (25), i.e.,
(a1, a2, a3) =W1S
′
1[:, (1 : 2)]G[3,2]
(b1, b2, b3) = W2S
′
2. (26)
1For records of large size, they can be divided into stripes in F 3q , i.e., Wi ∈ F
3
qℓ
for ℓ stripes. The scheme works identically on all the stripes in parallel.
9For any two colluding servers, say Serv(1) and Serv(3), their query sequence is {a1, b1, a3 + b3}. For every choice of S1 and
S2 in (25), one can correspondingly find S
′
1 and S
′
2 in (26) such that they produce the same sequence {a1, a3, b1, b3}, i.e.,
(a1, a3) = W1S1[:, (1, 3)] = W1S
′
1[:, (1 : 2)]G[3,2][:, (1, 3)]
(b1, b3) = W2S2[:, (1 : 2)]G[3,2][:, (1, 3)] =W2S
′
2[:, (1, 3)] (27)
where G[3,2][:, (1, 3)] is a 2 × 2 matrix formed by the first and the third columns of G[3,2]. Because G[3,2][:, (1, 3)] is an
invertible matrix, the one-to-one correspondence between Si and S
′
i satisfying (27) can be easily established, implying the
identical distribution of {a1, b1, a3 + b3} for retrieving W1 and for retrieving W2. Similar observations hold for all colluding
subset containing at most 2 servers, thus the privacy condition follows.
Finally, it is easy to see the desired record consists of 3 symbols while the answers totally contain 5 symbols, so the scheme
has rate 35 attaining the capacity for this case.
Next we give some remarks to reveal more design ideas behind the scheme construction.
Remark 3. In the mixing-expanding part, the desired record goes through an invertible transformation and generates a symbol
vector consisting of L independent symbols, while each of the undesired records abandons a fraction of symbols and then
generates an L-dimensional symbol vector with redundancy through MDS codes.
Remark 4. In the combining part, the answers provided by each server are generated by multiplying the record vector by a
combining matrix which is fixed for given values of M,N, T , and independent of the index of the desired record.
As in Example 1, the answers of the first server Serv(1) is (a1, b1). Obviously,
(a1, b1) = (a[1:3], b[1:3])
(
e
τ
1 0
0 e
τ
1
)
(28)
where e1 = (1, 0, 0). Thus the combining matrix for Serv
(1) is
(
e
τ
1 0
0 e
τ
1
)
. Similarly, one can write down the combining
matrices for Serv(2) and Serv(3) from the tables in Fig. 1.
Furthermore, by (25) and (28) the answers of Serv(1) for retrieving W1 can be written as
(a1, b1) = (W1,W2)
(
S1
S2[:, (1 : 2)]G[3,2]
)(
e
τ
1 0
0 e
τ
1
)
, (W1,W2)Q
where Q ∈ F6×2q is actually the query sent from the user to Serv
(1) for retrieving W1. It can be seen that Q is a random
variable induced by the random resources S1 and S2, and in (27) we actually proves Q has the identical distribution no matter
which record is desired. In our scheme description, we usually omit the complete form of query matrices as they can be directly
obtained by putting the mixing-expanding part and the combining part together.
Let us give one more example to help further understand the scheme construction.
Example 2. Suppose M = 3, N = 3, T = 2. In this case, the sub-packetization of our scheme is L = d(N
d
)M−1 = 9, so the
records are denoted by W1,W2,W3 ∈ F
9
q . WLOG, suppose the user wants W1.
In the mixing-expanding part, the user privately chooses matrices S1, S2, S3 randomly and uniformly from all 9×9 invertible
matrices over Fq . Let G[n,k] ∈ F
k×n
q denote a generator matrix of an [n, k] MDS code which is publicly kown. Then, define
a[1:9] = W1S1
b[1:9] =W2S2[:, (1 : 6)]G
c[1:9] = W3S3[:, (1 : 6)]G
where G =
(
G[6,4] 0
0 G[3,2]
)
. Actually, the 6 symbols drawn from W2, i.e., W2S2[:, (1 : 6)], by multiplying G are expanded in
two parts separately, that is, the first 4 symbols are expanded into 6 symbols by multiplying G[6,4] while the latter 2 symbols
are expanded into 3 symbols by multiplying G[3,2]. The same expanding process goes with W3.
In the Combining part, the generating process of queries to all serves by iteratively applying Step (a1) and (a2) is displayed
in Fig.2.
The correctness condition holds obviously. Note that b7+ c7, b8+ c8 are undesired symbols and they produce b9+ c9 in the
expanding process through a [3, 2] MDS code. Therefore, the user can obtain a9 from a9+ b9+ c9. The privacy condition can
be verified similarly as in Example 1. The rate of this scheme is 919 which matches the capacity for this case.
The above two examples provide an overview of the scheme construction, leaving some details to be clarified, such as
(1) How many desired symbols are queried directly from each server in the combing part?
(2) What are the parameters for the MDS codes used in the mixing-expanding part?
In the next sections we will fill in the details.
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Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1 a2 a3, a4
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1
b1
c1
a2
b2
c2
a3, a4
b3, b4
c3, c4
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1
b1
c1
a2
b2
c2
a3, a4
b3, b4
c3, c4
a5 + b5 a6 + b6
a7 + c5 a8 + c6
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1
b1
c1
a2
b2
c2
a3, a4
b3, b4
c3, c4
a5 + b5 a6 + b6
a7 + c5 a8 + c6
b7 + c7 b8 + c8
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1
b1
c1
a2
b2
c2
a3, a4
b3, b4
c3, c4
a5 + b5 a6 + b6
a7 + c5 a8 + c6
b7 + c7 b8 + c8
a9 + b9 + c9
(a1)
(a2)
(a1)
(a2)
Fig. 2. Query sequence in the (M = 3, N = 3, T = 2) PIR scheme.
B. Formal description of the general scheme
Our scheme can be seemed as an extension of the scheme in [15] from the case of T = 1 to the case of general T . As
pointed out in [15], a key idea for reducing sub-parcketization is to eliminate the symmetry across servers that was required
in [12], [13]. For example, in Fig. 1 one can see that two symbols are queried from Serv(1) and Serv(2) each while only one
symbol is queried from Serv(3). But for the requirement of symmetry across servers, it is supposed to query the same number
of symbols from each server. However, designing for each server a special query sequence makes the scheme too complicated.
It turns out dividing the servers into two disjoint groups and enforcing symmetry across the servers within each group suffice
to reduce sub-parcketization and to achieve capacity simultaneously. In our scheme, the first T servers are in one group and
the remaining N − T servers are in the other. Actually, one can divide the servers arbitrarily as long as one group contains T
servers and the other contains the rest servers.
We now start to give a general description of the scheme. As in the examples, we describe the scheme in two parts.
Part 1: Mixing-Expanding. Denote the M records as Wi ∈ F
L
q , 1 ≤ i ≤M . Suppose the user wants Wθ for some θ ∈ [M ].
Then define
Uθ = (uθ,1, ..., uθ,L) = WθSθ (29)
Ui = (ui,1, ..., ui,L) = WiSi[:, (1 : ℓ)]G, ∀i ∈ [M ]− {θ},
where S1, ..., SM are the random matrices chosen by the user uniformly from all L × L invertible matrices over Fq . Here
we leave ℓ and the specific form of G to be determined in Section IV-D. One needs to know that, for the desired record Wθ ,
the symbols uθ,1, ..., uθ,L are independent, while for each undesired record Wi, i ∈ [M ]− {θ}, the symbols ui,1, ..., ui,L are
expanded from ℓ independent symbols through MDS encoding.
Part 2: Combining. For 1 ≤ k ≤ M and for a subset Λ ⊆ [M ] with |Λ| = k, we call the sum
∑
i∈Λ ui,ji a Λ-type k-sum.
The queries to each server are composed of these k-sums. Moreover, because of applying Step (a1), the queries to each server
contain the same number of k-sums for every type Λ with |Λ| = k, and we denote this number as γ
(i)
k for server Serv
(i). For
example, in Example 2 we have γ
(i)
1 = γ
(i)
2 = 1, γ
(i)
3 = 0 for i = 1, 2 and γ
(3)
1 = 2, γ
(3)
2 = 0, γ
(3)
3 = 1. Recall that in our
scheme, the servers are divided into two groups and the servers within each groups are treated symmetrically. Therefore, for
1 ≤ k ≤M ,
γ
(1)
k = γ
(2)
k = · · · = γ
(T )
k , αk ,
γ
(T+1)
k = γ
(T+2)
k = · · · = γ
(N)
k , βk .
In order to provide a uniform arrangement of the k-sums in queries, we introduce a label (k, δ, ρ) for each type Λ ⊆ [M ],
where k = |Λ|, and {
δ = 1, 1 ≤ ρ ≤
(
M−1
k−1
)
if θ ∈ Λ
δ = 0, 1 ≤ ρ ≤
(
M−1
k
)
if θ 6∈ Λ
.
Actually, ρ is a counting index for all subsets Λ ⊆ [M ] with the given label (k, δ).
Then in Table 1 we give a general description of the queries in our scheme, and in Table 2 we further explain it by combing
with Example 2 in the case of θ = 1. Note that in Table 1, q
(i)
Λ,h denotes a Λ-type sum, i.e. q
(i)
Λ,h =
∑
ν∈Λ uν,[·]. Here h runs
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from 1 to α|Λ| (or β|Λ|), as a counting index for the Λ-type sums queried from Serv
(i). Inside the Λ-type sum
∑
ν∈Λ uν,[·],
we do not specify the second subscript of the symbols while use [·] instead, because these symbols are drawn successively
from Uν . That is, for each k-sum that involves Uν we draw a symbol from Uν that has not been used in previous queries. For
example, in Table 2 the subscripts in ai, bi, ci’s are drawn successively from 1 to 9.
label of Λ, (k, δ, ρ) Serv(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ T Serv(j), T < j ≤ N
k ∈ [M ]
δ = 1
ρ = 1 q(i)Λ,1, ..., q
(i)
Λ,αk
q
(j)
Λ,1, ..., q
(j)
Λ,βk
· · · · · · · · ·
ρ =
(M−1
k−1
)
q
(i)
Λ,1, ..., q
(i)
Λ,αk
q
(j)
Λ,1, ..., q
(j)
Λ,βk
δ = 0
ρ = 1 q(i)Λ,1, ..., q
(i)
Λ,αk
q
(j)
Λ,1, ..., q
(j)
Λ,βk
· · · · · · · · ·
ρ =
(M−1
k
)
q
(i)
Λ,1, ..., q
(i)
Λ,αk
q
(j)
Λ,1, ..., q
(j)
Λ,βk
Table 1
label of Λ, (k, δ, ρ) Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
k = 1
δ = 1 Λ = {1} a1 a2 a3, a4
δ = 0
Λ = {2} b1 b2 b3, b4
Λ = {3} c1 c2 c3, c4
k = 2
δ = 1
Λ = {1, 2} a5 + b5 a6 + b6
Λ = {1, 3} a7 + c5 a8 + c6
δ = 0 Λ = {2, 3} b7 + c7 b8 + c8
k = 3 δ = 1 Λ = {1, 2, 3} a9 + b9 + c9
Table 2
IN EXAMPLE 2, (α1 = α2 = 1, α3 = 0; β1 = 2, β2 = 0, β3 = 1.)
Therefore, once given the values of αk, βk, 1 ≤ k ≤ M , one can immediately write down all queries in the scheme based
on Table 1. The queries are usually arranged in the order that k runs from 1 to M , while for each value of k one can arrange
the k-sums according to an arbitrary order of the Λ’s because all types Λ ⊆ [M ] with |Λ| = k will occur.
But in Table 1 and Table 2 the queries for each k are arranged according to whether δ = 1 or δ = 0. The reason for this
arrangement is that we want to differentiate the mixed symbols (or desired symbols for k = 1) from the undesired symbols
for the convenience of latter analysis. It is important to note that the order of Λ’s should reveal no information on θ, so in
actual implementation the user arranges the queries according to an arbitrarily given order of all types Λ ⊆ [M ] with |Λ| = k.
Then we determine the parameters αk, βk for the combining part and ℓ, G for the mixing-expanding part respectively in
the next two sections.
C. Parameters in the combining part
The parameters αk and βk are computed as a result of establishing sufficient conditions for the correctness requirement and
the privacy requirement of the PIR scheme.
(s1) A sufficient condition for the correctness requirement:
For any Λ ⊆ [M ]− {θ}, denote Λ = Λ ∪ {θ}. Suppose |Λ| = k, and denote
QΛ = (q
(1)
Λ,[1:αk ]
, ..., q
(T )
Λ,[1:αk]
, q
(T+1)
Λ,[1:βk]
, ..., q
(N)
Λ,[1:βk]
)
QΛ = (q
(1)
Λ,[1:αk+1]
, ..., q
(T )
Λ,[1:αk+1]
, q
(T+1)
Λ,[1:βk+1]
, ..., q
(N)
Λ,[1:βk+1]
)
Then QΛ is a (Tαk + (N − T )βk)-dimensional vector and QΛ is a (Tαk+1 + (N − T )βk+1)-dimensional vector. The
sufficient condition is that
(QΛ, QΛ − U˜θ) = QΛGk , (30)
where Gk is a generator matrix of an MDS code with dimension Tαk+(N−T )βk and information rate
T
N
, and QΛ− U˜θ
means eliminating the symbols of Uθ from the coordinates of QΛ.
Eg. in Table 2, for Λ = {3} it requires that (c1, c2, ..., c6) is a codeword in a [6, 4] MDS code; for Λ = {2, 3} it requires that
(b7 + c7, b8 + c8, b9 + c9) is a codeword in a [3, 2] MDS code. We first explain why the condition (s1) is sufficient for the
correctness requirement. Since the user can directly get QΛ and QΛ from the servers, he can first recover QΛ − U˜θ from (30)
and then derive U˜θ which contains a part of desired symbols. In a similar way, for Λ running through all subsets in [M ]−{θ},
the user can recover all desired symbols involved in mixed symbols, in addition to the desired symbols directly received from
servers when k = 1, the user can finally collect all the desired symbols needed to recover the desired record Wθ . Note that
the total number of the desired symbols (including those appear in mixed symbols) equals the number of Λ-type sums with
δ(Λ) = 1. Thus the invertible transformation in (29) implies that
L =
M∑
k=1
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
(Tαk + (N − T )βk) . (31)
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Because the MDS code we used in (s1) has information rate T
N
, then we can derive a relation between αk and βk from the
sufficient condition (30), i.e., for 1 ≤ k < M ,
(Tαk + (N − T )βk)
N − T
T
= Tαk+1 + (N − T )βk+1. (32)
(s2) A sufficient condition for the privacy requirement:
For any subset Γ ⊂ [N ] with |Γ| ≤ T , denote by UΓi , 1 ≤ i ≤ M , the vector consisting of symbols from Ui that are
involved in the queries to servers in Γ. The sufficient condition is that UΓ1 , ..., U
Γ
M are independent vectors consisting of
the same number of coordinates drawn independently and uniformly from Fq.
Eg. in Example 2 suppose Γ = {2, 3}, then we have UΓ1 = (a2, a3, a4, a6, a8, a9), U
Γ
2 = {b2, b3, b4, b6, b8, b9} and U
Γ
3 =
{c2, c3, c4, c6, c8, c9}. According to (s2) it requires that U
Γ
1 , U
Γ
2 , U
Γ
3 are independent and each one is composed of 6 independent
symbols. Recall in Remark 2 we assume that for each record Wi = (wi,1, ..., wi,L) ∈ F
L
q , the symbols wi,1, ..., wi,L are drawn
independently and uniformly from Fq . Moreover, Wi and Wj are independent for i 6= j. The following proposition states an
evident fact and we omit its proof.
Proposition 13. Suppose Wi = (wi,1, ..., wi,L) ∈ F
L
q is composed of L symbols drawn independently and uniformly from Fq,
and (ui,1, ..., ui,h) = WiS for some matrix S ∈ F
L×h
q , 1 ≤ h ≤ L. Then ui,1, ..., ui,h are independent if and only if S has
rank h.
We now explain why (s2) is sufficient for the privacy requirement. For any colluding subset Γ ⊂ [N ] with |Γ| ≤ T , the
queries to servers in Γ are computed as (UΓ1 , U
Γ
2 , ..., U
Γ
M )C after the combining part, where C is the combining matrix which
is fixed for given values of M,N, T . Moreover, UΓi = WiS˜
Γ
i for some matrix S˜
Γ
i , then to clarify the privacy requirement
it is sufficient to show that S˜Γ1 , ..., S˜
Γ
M are identically distributed. By the condition (s2) and Proposition 13, it implies that
S˜Γ1 , ..., S˜
Γ
M are all composed of the same number of linearly independent columns. Since S˜
Γ
i ’s are actually generated from the
random matrices Si’s which are unknown to the servers, the colluding subset Γ cannot tell the difference between the S˜
Γ
i ’s.
Therefore, the privacy requirement is satisfied.
According to (30) the undesired symbols are expanded by using independent MDS codes, so dependence may only happen
within the same MDS codes. However, from the MDS property and Proposition 13, any T symbols of a codeword of an [N, T ]
MDS code are independent. So based on the general scheme, a sufficient condition for (s2) is that for 1 ≤ k < M , and for
any x ∈ N with 0 ≤ x ≤ T ,
x(αk + αk+1) + (T − x)(βk + βk+1) ≤ Tαk + (N − T )βk. (33)
Actually in (33), x , |Γ∩ [T ]|, thus the left side of (33) is the number of symbols from each undesired record involved in the
codeword (QΛ, QΛ − U˜θ) which according to (30) is an MDS codeword, and the right side of (33) equals the dimension of
the MDS code.
Therefore, αk, βk are actually the integral solutions to (30) and (33). We further find out the condition{
Tαk+1 = (N − T )βk
αk + αk+1 = βk + βk+1
implies (30) and (33) simultaneously. Thus we only need to solve the following simplified equations on αk and βk, i.e.
Tαk+1 = (N − T )βk
αk + αk+1 = βk + βk+1
αk, βk ∈ N, 1 ≤ k < M
(34)
From the recursive relations in (34) we get two geometric series, i.e.,{
Tαk+1 + (N − T )βk+1 = (
N−T
T
)k(Tα1 + (N − T )β1)
αk+1 − βk+1 = (−1)
k(α1 − β1)
(35)
By giving proper initial values to α1 and β1, we can finally get the solutions to (34). Specifically, when N ≥ 2T , the first
series in (35), i.e., {Tαk + (N − T )βk}1≤k≤M is increasing, so we set α1 = t
M−2 and β1 = 0 to ensure αk, βk ∈ N for
1 ≤ k < M . Under this initial values, we get the solutions{
αk =
(n−t)k−2−(−t)k−2
n
(n− t)tM−k
βk =
(n−t)k−1−(−t)k−1
n
tM−k
(36)
where n = N
d
, t = T
d
and d = gcd(N, T ). When T < N < 2T , the series {Tαk + (N − T )βk}1≤k≤M is decreasing, so we
alternatively set αM = 0, βM = (n− t)
M−2, and get the solutions{
αk =
tM−k−(t−n)M−k
n
(n− t)k−1
βk =
tM−k−1−(t−n)M−k−1
n
t(n− t)k−1
(37)
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In summary, (36) and (37) respectively give the solution to (34) for the case N ≥ 2T and the case T < N < 2T . In both
cases, one can check that
Tαk + (N − T )βk = d(n− t)
k−1tM−k . (38)
D. Parameters in the mixing-expanding part
In this section we determine the parameter ℓ and the matrix G in (29). This is equivalent to determining the MDS codes
used in the mixing-expanding part for the undesired records.
For any undesired index i ∈ [M ]− {θ}, denote Ii = {Λ | Λ ⊆ [M ]− {θ}, i ∈ Λ}. Thus the set
{(QΛ, QΛ) | Λ ∈ Ii} (39)
covers all coordinates of Ui and each coordinate appears exactly once. This implies that
L =
M−1∑
k=1
(
M − 2
k − 1
)
(T (αk + αk+1) + (N − T )(βk + βk+1)) (40)
Since our solutions of αk, βk satisfying (38), one can check that (40) coincides with (31) , while the former computes L
by counting the number of undesired symbols and the latter computed by counting the number of desired symbols. This
consistence just verifies application of Step (a1) throughout the scheme implementation.
Moreover, as required by the condition (s1), (QΛ, QΛ− U˜θ) is a codeword of an MDS code. Thus in (39) a total number of∑M−1
k=1
(
M−2
k−1
)
= 2M−2 MDS codes are involved. Actually, these MDS codes can be indexed by Ii. From (30) we also know
that for each Λ ∈ Ii with |Λ| = k, the corresponding MDS code has dimension Tαk + (N − T )βk and information rate
T
N
,
and we denote its generator matrix as Gk. Furthermore, according the condition (s2), these MDS codewords must be mutually
independent.
However, for any Λ ∈ Ii, each coordinate of (QΛ, QΛ − U˜θ) is a Λ-type sum. By linearity of the MDS code we used, it
is sufficient to require that for all j ∈ Λ, the corresponding coordinates of Uj form a codeword from the same MDS code.
For example, in table 2 by the condition (s1) it requires that (b7 + c7, b8 + c8, b9 + c9) is an MDS codewords, for which it is
sufficient to require that both (b7, b8, b9) and (c7, c8, c9) are codewords from the same MDS code.
Therefore, if we arrange the elements in Ii according to an increasing order of cardinality, i.e., Ii = {Λ1, ...,Λ2M−2} where
|Λj | ≤ |Λj′ | for j < j
′, and rearrange the coordinates of Ui correspondingly, i.e.,
Ui = (Ui,Λ1 , Ui,Λ1 , Ui,Λ2 , Ui,Λ2 , ..., Ui,Λ2M−2 , Ui,Λ2M−2 ) (41)
where Ui,Λj contains the coordinates of Ui that appear in QΛj and Λj = Λj ∪ {θ} for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2
M−2, then one can see
Ui = (Ui,Λ1 , Ui,Λ2 , ..., Ui,Λ2M−2 )G˜ (42)
where
G˜ = diag[I1 ⊗G1, I(M−21 )
⊗G2, ..., I(M−2k−1 )
⊗Gk, ..., I1 ⊗GM−1]. (43)
Here, diag[A,B] denotes a diagonal block matrix with A and B lying on the diagonal, Ij denotes the j×j identity matrix, and
recall that Gk is a generator matrix of a fixed MDS code with dimension Tαk+(N −T )βk and information rate
T
N
. Because
for each k ∈ [M − 1], there are
(
M−2
k−1
)
Λ’s in Ii with |Λ| = k, and each Λ corresponds to an MDS code with generator matrix
Gk, thus I(M−2k−1 )
⊗Gk denotes the MDS encoding of the corresponding coordinates in the Λ-type sums with |Λ| = k. From
(42) and (43), one can see that Ui is actually the direct sum of all the independent MDS codewords, which coincides with the
requirement of (s1) and (s2). Finally, the order that we take symbols from Ui in the combining part as described in Section
IV-B is a little different from that presented in (41), so the actual form of G can be obtained from G˜ in (43) through a proper
column permutation.
From (42), one can compute the value of ℓ, i.e.
ℓ =
2M−2∑
j=1
|Λj |
=
M−1∑
k=1
(
M − 2
k − 1
)
(Tαk + (N − T )βk)
(a)
= d
M−1∑
k=1
(
M − 2
k − 1
)
(n− t)k−1tM−k
= TnM−2
where (a) is from (38).
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Remark 5. Note that Fq is the base field for this scheme, and its size depends on parameters of the MDS codes used in the
mixing-expanding part. From (43) one can see a total of M − 1 MDS codes over Fq have been used, each of which has length
N
T
(Tαk + (N − T )βk), 1 ≤ k < M . Therefore, combining with (38) it must have
q ≥
N
T
(Tαk + (N − T )βk) = N(n− t)
k−1tM−k−1.
It is sufficient to require q ≥ max1≤k<M{N(n− t)
k−1tM−k−1} = max{NtM−2, N(n− t)M−2}. One can see the capacity-
achieving scheme in [13] works over a finite field Fq with q ≥ max{N
2TM−2, N2(N − T )M−2}. Thus we reduce the field
size by a factor of 1
NdM−2
.
E. Properties of the scheme
In this section, we verify the scheme described in Section IV-B has properties: (1) correctness and privacy as required in
Section II-A; (2) optimal sub-packetization; (3) achieving the capacity.
Because we have stated in Section IV-C that the conditions (s1) and (s2) are sufficient for the requirement of correctness
and privacy, and the parameters we determined in Section IV-C and Section IV-D ensure that our scheme can satisfy (s1) and
(s2), thus our PIR scheme satisfies correctness and privacy.
Then we compute subpacektization of the scheme, that is, computing the value of L. By (31) and (38), we have
L =
M∑
k=1
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
d(n− t)k−1tM−k = dnM−1 ,
attaining the lower bound on L we proved in Theorem 4. As a result, our scheme achieves the optimal sub-packetization.
Finally, the rate of our scheme equals L
D
, where D is number of symbols downloaded from all servers. From Table 1 one
can see
D =
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
(Tαk + (N − T )βk)
=
M∑
k=1
(
M
k
)
d(n− t)k−1tM−k
=
d(nM − tM )
n− t
.
Therefore, the rate equals L
D
= dnM−1 × n−t
d(nM−tM ) =
1− T
N
1−( T
N
)M
attaining capacity for the PIR schemes.
Corollary 14. For the nontrivial case, i.e., M ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ T < N , the optimal sub-packetization for a linear capacity-
achieving T -private PIR scheme for N replicated servers and M records, is dnM−1, where d = gcd(N, T ) and n = N
d
.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Sub-packetization is an important parameter related to the implementation complexity of a scheme. In this work we
determine the optimal sub-packetization for linear capacity-achieving schemes with replicated servers. The relations between
sub-packetization, download rate, and field size for PIR schemes deserve further studies in the future.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR LEMMA 1 IN SECTION II-B
Lemma 1. For any θ, θ′ ∈ [M ], and for any subset Λ ⊆ [M ] and Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| ≤ T ,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
Γ
θ′ |WΛ,Q) .
Proof. From the privacy condition (6), we have that I(θ;WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) = 0, implying H(WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) = H(WΛ,Q
Γ
θ′). Similarly,
H(AΓθ ,WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) = H(A
Γ
θ′ ,WΛ,Q
Γ
θ′). It immediately follows that H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) = H(A
Γ
θ′ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ′).
Then the lemma follows from the claim below:
Claim: For any θ ∈ [M ], and for any subset Λ ⊆ [M ] and Γ ⊆ [N ], H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) = H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q).
Proof of the claim. On the one hand, it obviously holds H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) ≥ H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q). On the other hand ,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ )−H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q)
= I(AΓθ ;Q \Q
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ )
≤ I(AΓθ ,W[M]−Λ;Q \Q
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ )
= I(W[M]−Λ;Q \Q
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) + I(A
Γ
θ ;Q \Q
Γ
θ |W[M],Q
Γ
θ )
(a)
= 0 .
Note the equality in (a) comes from the facts I(W[M ]−Λ;Q \ Q
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q
Γ
θ ) = 0 and I(A
Γ
θ ;Q \ Q
Γ
θ |W[M ],Q
Γ
θ ) = 0, where
the former is due to (3) and the latter is from (4).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE LEMMAS IN SECTION III-C
Lemma 11. Let a, b,m ∈ N. Suppose d1 = gcd(a, b), d2 = gcd(a
m,
∑m
i=0 a
m−ibi), then d2 = d
m
1 .
Proof. Obviously dm1 |d2. Let a = a1d1, b = b1d1, c =
d2
dm1
, then gcd(a1, b1) = 1 and c|a
m
1 , c|
∑m
i=0 a
m−i
1 b
i
1. If c 6= 1, then
for any prime factor p of c, it must have p|am1 and p|
∑m
i=0 a
m−i
1 b
i
1, implying p|a1 and p|b1, which contradicts the fact
gcd(a1, b1) = 1.
Lemma 12. Let V1, ..., VN be N linear subspaces of F
L and denote V =
∑N
i=1 Vi. Suppose T ∈ N and 1 ≤ T < N . If for any
subset Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = T it holds dim(
∑
i∈Γ Vi) =
T
N
dimV , then N | dimV and dim(Vi) =
1
N
dimV for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Moreover, V = ⊕Ni=1Vi.
Proof. We first give two claims which hold under the hypothesis of the lemma:
Claim 1: There exists i0 ∈ [N ] such that dimVi0 ≥ ⌈
dimV
N
⌉.
Claim 2: For 1 ≤ s ≤ T , for any subset Γ′ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ′| = s, it holds
dim
∑
i∈Γ′
Vi ≤
T
N
dimV − (T − s)⌈
dimV
N
⌉ . (44)
Note that Claim 1 is a direct result of the fact dimV ≤
∑N
i=1 dimVi. Next we prove Claim 2 by induction on s. For s = T ,
(44) holds from the hypothesis of the lemma. Then we assume that (44) holds for some s > 1 and prove it also holds for
s− 1.
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On the contrary, we assume there exists Γ′ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ′| = s− 1, such that
dim
∑
i∈Γ′
Vi >
T
N
dimV − (T − s+ 1)⌈
dimV
N
⌉ . (45)
Select Γ′′ ⊆ [N ] such that Γ′ ⊂ Γ′′ and |Γ′′| = s. Denote Γ′′ = [N ]− Γ′′ and V ′′ =
∑
i∈Γ′′ Vi. Since (44) holds for s, it has
dimV ′′ ≤ T
N
dimV − (T − s)⌈dimV
N
⌉. Therefore,
dim
∑
j∈Γ′′
Vj/(Vj ∩ V
′′) ≥ dimV − dimV ′′
≥ dimV −
T
N
dimV + (T − s)⌈
dimV
N
⌉
≥
N − s
N
dimV.
Because |Γ′′| = N − s, by a deduction similar to that of Claim 1 we have dimVj0/(Vj0 ∩ V
′′) ≥ ⌈dimV
N
⌉ for some j0 ∈ Γ′′.
Therefore,
dim
∑
i∈Γ′∪{j0}
Vi = dim
∑
i∈Γ′
Vi + dimVj0/(Vj0 ∩
∑
i∈Γ′
Vi)
(a)
≥ dim
∑
i∈Γ′
Vi + dimVj0/(Vj0 ∩ V
′′)
(b)
>
T
N
dimV − (T − s+ 1)⌈
dimV
N
⌉+ ⌈
dimV
N
⌉
=
T
N
dimV − (T − s)⌈
dimV
N
⌉
where (a) holds because
∑
i∈Γ′ Vi ⊂ V
′′, and (b) is based on the assumption (45). However, |Γ′ ∪ {j0}| = s, thus we get a
contradiction to the induction base that (44) holds for s. Hence the assumption (45) is not true and Claim 2 holds correctly.
Set s = 1, from Claim 2 we have for all i ∈ [N ],
dimVi ≤
T
N
dimV − (T − 1)⌈
dimV
N
⌉ ≤
1
N
dimV ≤
1
N
N∑
i=1
dimVi,
implying that dimVi =
1
N
∑N
i=1 dim Vi for all i ∈ [N ]. The lemma follows immediately.
